Mentally disordered offenders: criteria for commitment.

A new Section 1 states it is the Legislature's intent that the risk factors in subdivision (d)(1) of Section 2962 do not impact the application of People v. Jenkins (2023) and People v. Johnson (2020), effectively shielding those court rulings from being overridden by the new statutory factors.

The venue for filing a judicial review petition was changed from the superior court of the county of commitment to state prison to the superior court of the county in which the prisoner is incarcerated or being treated, which could matter for prisoners temporarily housed in other counties.

The mandatory requirement that a prisoner undergo the Historical Clinical Risk Management-20, Version 3 (HCR-20 V3) assessment as published by Simon Fraser University was removed from the certification process in Section 2962(d)(1).

The standard for psychiatric/psychological risk assessment was narrowed from 'shall consider all of the following' to 'shall consider all of the following factors as they relate to current risk,' adding a temporal focus that could exclude some historical factors from consideration.

Multiple provisions in Sections 2962 and 2966 were restructured into numbered subparagraphs (e.g., subdivision (a) of Section 2966 was broken into paragraphs (1) through (5), and subdivision (b) into paragraphs (1) through (16)) for organizational clarity.

Terminology was updated in Section 2966(b) to use 'petitioner' instead of 'prisoner' in several places, reflecting that the individual has already filed a petition at that stage of the process.

All amendments to Penal Code Sections 2970 and 2972 were removed. These sections governed continued involuntary treatment after parole termination (180-day evaluation requirement, district attorney petition for one-year continued treatment) and the court proceedings for such continued treatment (jury trial, standard of proof, recommitment procedures). The bill now only amends Sections 2962 and 2966.

New subsection 2962(d)(1)(A)(ii) requires that when determining whether a prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others, a psychiatrist or psychologist must consider five specific factors: (I) the prisoner's history of violence related to their severe mental health disorder, (II) current mental status, (III) recent behavior and treatment response, (IV) current capacity to inflict physical harm including age, physical condition, and present limitations, and (V) any clinically relevant factor bearing directly on risk of physical harm.

Section 2966(b) clarifies that a prisoner who disagrees with the Board of Parole Hearings determination must file a petition in the superior court of the county of commitment to state prison. A new stipulation mechanism is added allowing the petitioner, prosecuting attorney, and defense counsel to agree to conduct the hearing in the county of commitment to state prison.

The legislative counsel's digest was updated to reflect the narrowed scope (removing references to Sections 2970 and 2972) and to describe the new danger assessment criteria and stipulation mechanism. The bill title was shortened from 'Sections 2962, 2966, 2970, and 2972' to 'Sections 2962 and 2966.'

The bill no longer amends Penal Code Sections 2970 and 2972. It now only amends Sections 2962 and 2966, removing the changes that would have affected the district attorney's petition process for continued involuntary treatment after parole termination (Section 2970) and the court hearing procedures for recommitment (Section 2972).

The danger standard is elevated from 'threat of physical harm to others' to 'substantial danger to the health and safety of others' in multiple provisions, including the certification criteria in Section 2962(d)(1), the parole continuation provision in Section 2966(c), and the defined term in Section 2962(g). This is a higher threshold that must be met before a prisoner can be committed as a mentally disordered offender.

In Section 2966(b), the venue for filing a court petition challenging a Board of Parole Hearings determination changes from 'the county in which the prisoner is incarcerated or is being treated' to 'the county of commitment to state prison.' This restricts where prisoners can seek judicial review of their commitment.

The defined term in Section 2962(g) changes from 'threat of physical harm' to 'substantial danger of physical harm,' with the clarification that it does not require proof of a recent overt act. This aligns the definition with the new elevated standard used throughout the bill.

The dangerousness standard for involuntary commitment of mentally disordered offenders was changed from 'substantial danger threat of physical harm to others' to 'threat of physical harm to substantial danger to the health and safety of others.' This appears to correct a drafting error in the introduced version and broadens the standard by covering threats to health and safety, not just physical harm.

The definitional provision (Section 2965(g)) was updated to match the new standard, now defining 'threat substantial danger of physical harm' rather than 'substantial danger threat of physical harm,' while retaining the clarification that proof of a recent overt act is not required.

The arson offense criterion in Section 2965(e)(2)(L) was updated from 'posed a substantial danger threat of physical harm to others' to 'posed a threat substantial danger of physical harm to others,' aligning it with the corrected standard used throughout the bill.