Criminal procedure: writs of habeas corpus and motions to vacate.

A prosecutorial concession is now binding only if it is contained in a return or other filing signed by counsel for respondent and expressly identifies the factual basis. The prior Senate version made any concession in open court or in a pleading (including informal responses) automatically binding and non-withdrawable, meaning oral concessions no longer carry the same weight.

A stipulation is now binding only if it is filed with the court, signed by counsel for both parties, and expressly identifies the factual or legal basis being stipulated to. The prior version simply stated stipulations were binding on the parties without these specific formal requirements.

The Senate version required courts to grant relief based on a concession or stipulation unless contrary to law, and made any order rejecting such a concession or stipulation appealable. The enrolled version replaces this with a presumption in favor of granting relief that can be overcome if the record contradicts the concession or stipulation or if granting would produce an order contrary to law, and removes the explicit appealability provision.

The entire amendment to Section 3007.05 was removed. This provision would have required CDCR and DMV to ensure exonerated persons receive valid ID cards, facilitate access to public services and programs, and extended that assistance to persons exonerated of juvenile delinquency adjudications. It also revised the definition of 'exonerated' to drop the requirement that evidence 'unerringly points to innocence.'

New legislative findings were added stating the Legislature reaffirms its intolerance for wrongful convictions and rejection of prior case law requiring innocent people to produce evidence that points unerringly to innocence and undermines the prosecution's entire case.

Concessions by the district attorney or Attorney General are now binding only if contained in a return or other filing signed by counsel for respondent and expressly identifies the factual basis. Concessions are deemed a forfeiture of the right to put forth rebuttal evidence. Stipulations must be filed with the court, signed by counsel for both parties, and expressly identify the factual or legal basis being stipulated to, and are also deemed a forfeiture of the right to put forth rebuttal evidence.

A new presumption in favor of granting relief based on a concession or stipulation was added. This presumption can be overcome only if the record before the court contradicts the concession or stipulation, or if granting relief would lead to an order contrary to law.

For intellectual disability stipulations under Section 1376(j), the court must now accept a prosecution stipulation or concession unless it finds the stipulation is not supported by documentary evidence providing a factual basis for concluding by a preponderance of the evidence that the person has an intellectual disability. If the court declines, it must state its factual and legal rationale on the record.

The standard for establishing a 'significant dispute' about expert testimony was narrowed. It now requires 'qualified admissible expert testimony or declaration that undermines the reliability or validity of the diagnosis, technique, methods, theories, research, or studies upon which a medical, scientific, or forensic expert at trial, or a hearing, based their testimony,' rather than simply qualified expert testimony or declaration.

Section 1473(b)(1)(D) now requires that the significant dispute regarding expert medical, scientific, or forensic testimony 'was not previously presented and heard at trial.' This narrows the habeas ground by excluding disputes that were already litigated during the original proceedings.

Section 1473(c) corrected a duplicated word: 'the petitioner shall may either identify' changed to 'the petitioner may either identify,' removing the erroneous 'shall.'

The bill title line now reads 'Sections 1376, 1473, 1473.6, 1473.7, 1484, and 3007.05 and 1484 of the Penal Code,' which appears to be a clerical error duplicating section 1484.

The new evidence standard for habeas relief was lowered: removed requirements that evidence be 'presented without substantial delay, is admissible, and is sufficiently material and credible,' and changed the outcome standard from 'more likely than not would have changed the outcome' to 'reasonable probability it would have produced a different result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'

The false evidence standard was modified by removing the word 'material' as a standalone requirement for both false evidence (subparagraph A) and false physical evidence (subparagraph B), though a reasonable likelihood of affecting the outcome is still required.

The expert testimony dispute standard was lowered in two ways: removed the requirement that the dispute must have 'emerged or further developed' (so pre-existing disputes now qualify), and changed from 'more likely than not affected the outcome' to simply 'affected the outcome.' Also removed the word 'credible' before 'qualified expert testimony.'

The standard for overcoming procedural bars (untimeliness or successiveness) was expanded: petitioners may now either identify changes in law or new evidence, OR establish that their allegations create a reasonable probability of a different result. Previously only the latter path existed.

Prosecutorial concessions were changed from creating a 'presumption in favor of granting relief' (which could be overcome if the record contradicted the concession or it would lead to an order contrary to law) to being binding on the parties and non-withdrawable when made in open court or in a pleading.

The definition of 'false evidence' was reorganized: the provision about expert opinions being repudiated or undermined by scientific knowledge was moved from a separate paragraph (b)(2) into the definition itself under subparagraph (A)(ii).

Added a requirement that the department provide exoneration assistance to a person exonerated of a juvenile delinquency adjudication for which the person is serving a sentence as a result of that adjudication at the time of exoneration.

Changed 'immaterial to' to 'unnecessary for' regarding whether prosecution knowledge of false evidence is required, and changed 'must shall be established' to 'shall be established' in the preponderance standard language.